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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-1783 
_____________ 
  
JERMAINE LAJUAN KERR, 
Petitioner 
     
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
       Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A059-127-018) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Kuyomars Golparvar 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a): 
March 5, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, AMBRO and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: May 21, 2019) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
                                              
 *  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Petitioner Jermaine LaJuan Kerr seeks review of the decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal of an order of removal entered 
by the Immigration Court.  While Kerr advances several arguments in support of his 
Petition, he advanced none of these arguments in support of his appeal to the BIA.  
Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 places restrictions on the jurisdiction 
of this Court to review final orders of removal.  As relevant to this case, the Act provides 
that the Court may review final orders of removal only if “the alien has exhausted all 
administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  This 
statutory provision “require[s] an alien ‘to raise or exhaust his or her remedies as to each 
claim or ground for relief [before the BIA] if he or she is to preserve the right of judicial 
review of that claim.’”  Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2009) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595 (3d Cir.2003)).  This 
statutory exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional.  Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 245 n.8 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
 In support of his Petition, Kerr advances three arguments:  (1) the Immigration 
Court should have granted Kerr a continuance to afford him a reasonable opportunity to 
confer with his retained counsel, who allegedly provided ineffective assistance because 
Kerr may have been entitled to forms of relief that his counsel did not pursue, see Petitioner 
Br. 11–21; (2) the Immigration Court should have granted Kerr a continuance to afford his 
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retained counsel, who allegedly “babys[a]t Mr. Kerr for an afternoon,” an adequate 
opportunity to prepare to challenge the Government’s production of evidence that Kerr had 
committed either an “aggravated felony” or a “particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A) and 1231(b)(3)(B), respectively, id. at 29; and (3)  the Government failed 
to demonstrate that Kerr had been convicted of an aggravated felony, see id. at 29–38.  The 
sole issue that Kerr presented in his brief in support of his appeal to the BIA, however, was 
whether “the Immigration Judge err[ed] in his decision to deny [Kerr]’s application for 
withholding and request for deferral . . . under the Convention Against Torture, holding 
that [Kerr] had failed to meet his burden that he would be tortured if removed to Jamaica.”  
A.R. 19.  Thus, on appeal to the BIA, Kerr raised an issue solely with respect to the 
Immigration Judge’s determination that Kerr had not established a clear probability that he 
would be tortured if he were to return to his native country and country of citizenship, 
Jamaica.  Kerr did not raise issues with respect to the failure of the Immigration Court to 
grant a continuance, the effectiveness of his counsel, or the Immigration Court’s 
determinations regarding aggravated felonies or particularly serious crimes.1  See id. at 17–
28.  In fact, the BIA specifically noted in its opinion that Kerr “ha[d] not challenged the 
Immigration Judge’s findings” with respect to whether Kerr’s prior convictions constituted 
particularly serious crimes under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).  App. 11. 
                                              
1 To the extent Kerr is attempting to use his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a 
method for raising his otherwise unexhausted claims, such a claim must itself be exhausted.  
An ineffectiveness claim should be presented to the BIA in the first instance via a motion 
to reopen.  See Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2001).  Kerr did not move to 
reopen or attempt to comply with the BIA’s procedural requirements for pursuing an 
ineffectiveness claim.  See Fadiga v. Attorney Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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 Therefore, Kerr failed to preserve the right of judicial review of all the claims raised 
in his Petition because he failed to raise such claims on appeal to the BIA.  See Hoxha, 559 
F.3d at 159.  Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal 
on the bases advanced by Kerr pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  See Xie, 359 F.3d at 
245 n.8.  The Petition therefore will be denied. 
